ATRP HOME

A Look at the Department of Homeland Security’s Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standard and Its Impact on Poultry Processors and Growers

By John Starkey

IN THIS ISSUE Gaining New Ground on Biodiesel Conversion Efficiency The Economics of Biofuels Georgia Tech Students Study Biodiesel Production Using Algae High School Student Produces Homemade Biodiesel Using Restaurant Fryer Oil Defining Strategies to Control Storm Water Runoff from Poultry Processing Facilities Researchers Develop Process to Recover Eggshell Waste for Alternative Uses A Look at the Department of Homeland Security’s Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standard and Its Impact on Poultry Processors and Growers Changing Environmental and Energy Climate Creates New Opportunities for Electric Boilers and Water Heaters Bringing the Research Lab to the Classroom

 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued new regulations that require companies to assess the risk of their facilities to terroristic attack, and, if appropriate, take steps to mitigate that risk. The rule affects petroleum refineries, liquefied natural gas plants, and facilities that “possess” threshold quantities of chemicals listed by DHS in “Appendix A” of the regulation. While the rule itself became effective on June 8, 2007, a final Appendix A has not been published; hence, there remains some question about what chemicals – and threshold quantities – will be regulated under this regulation. The following summarizes rule requirements focused on food/poultry processing.

DHS has developed a secure, on-line Chemical Security Assessment Tool – or CSAT – to aid in identifying and prioritizing chemical security risk to aid in implementation of the rule. The regulated community must register for access to this tool, and provide DHS with a “chain of command” of company authorized users of CSAT.

Once registered, and Appendix A becomes available, a “Top Screen” must be completed. The Top Screen questionnaire in the CSAT tool is intended to provide the first characterization of potential risk posed by industrial facilities. As such, it evaluates the offsite impact of an intentional release of chemicals at a facility, or the risk posed by theft/diversion of chemicals at a facility. To do this, a modified version of the modeling software used for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Risk Management Program is utilized.

Upon completion of the Top Screen, the facility will receive – in real time on the secure CSAT network connection – a preliminary designation of whether or not the facility is deemed a high enough risk to be subject to further regulation. DHS believes 40,000-50,000 facilities across the nation will be required to complete a Top Screen. However, DHS indicated only 5,000-7,000 of these facilities will be subject to further regulation. The remainder will be notified – both on screen and in follow-up correspondence – they are exempt from subsequent steps.

Facilities that are not exempt will be assigned to one of four tiers, with Tier I representing higher relative risk, and Tier IV designating lower relative risk. All “tiered” facilities will next need to complete a Security Vulnerability Analysis (SVA), which will identify the specific chemical assets (e.g., ammonia receiver) of concern. The SVA will give a facility a “final” tier assignment and may now exempt a facility from future action. DHS will inspect a facility to verify the SVA information.

Finally, utilizing the information gathered in the SVA, a facility that is not exempted will develop a Site Security Plan (SSP) that describes how the facility will “deter, detect, and delay” a terroristic threat. The facility will be interacting with DHS – through the CSAT tool as well as site visits and direct communication – when developing the SVA and SSP. Ultimately, DHS will approve the SSP.

This is also an iterative process. Depending on a facility’s tier designation, in two or three years the facility will repeat the Top Screen/SVA/SSP process again. Obviously, the intent is to reduce identified risks over time, and thereby reduce the threat of terroristic attack on the facility.

One additional procedural note: a facility’s information developed for or pertaining exclusively to compliance with this rule (or derivative information) is classified as “chemical-terrorism vulnerability information” or “CVI.” This information should only be available to other company personnel on a “need-to-know” basis, and then only after completion of CVI training and implementation of a non-disclosure agreement.

Clearly, this is a very complex and extensive regulation requiring facilities to look at potential risks in a manner they likely have given little thought until now. Detailed information is beyond the scope of this article, but here are a few observations based on working with companies and DHS over the last few months on this rule.

You can find more detailed information on rule requirements at www.dhs.gov/chemicalsecurity or poultry industry-specific information at www.poultryegg.org.

 

John Starkey is vice president of Environmental Programs for the U.S. Poultry & Egg Association.